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“While much of the focus on venture philanthropy is on ‘capacity
building,’ this term has not been defined by either the new venture
philanthropists or the nonprofits who represent the potential
investment recipients, and may well mean something different to
each of them” says our published report, 2001 Venture Philan-
thropy: The Changing Landscape.  Since capacity building is
embraced and practiced by most people involved in venture philan-
thropy and many in traditional philanthropy as well, a broader
understanding of the concept is warranted. 
Investing in the people and systems that make products and services
better is well established in the for-profit sector. Consider the
millions spent on staff and warehouse facilities before Amazon.com
ever went on line.  Similarly, the three business leaders who
founded Venture Philanthropy Partners with 27 other investors
have been involved in substantial capacity building investments in
the business world for years.  They asked why organizations
created to eradicate poverty and solve the complex social problems
of our society are often not financed in a way that allows them to
develop or maintain their infrastructure.  Those investors created
VPP to speak to that disparity.  They decided to pool their
resources to make some substantial capacity building investments
in programs serving children from low-income families and use the
knowledge gained from those investments to encourage others to
do the same.  Their purpose was not to impose their personal
agendas, but rather to bring funds and expertise to strengthen
nonprofits with demonstrated success so those organizations could
do even more to improve the lives and opportunities of children. 
PREFACE 
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6As VPP began planning its fund, it seemed clear that we needed to
better understand how to make successful investments in organiza-
tional capacity.  Several foundations, support organizations and
think tanks have begun to explore capacity building.  As Elizabeth
T. Boris, director of the Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy at
The Urban Institute, noted in their recent report, “Capacity
building for nonprofit organizations is finally drawing the attention
it deserves ...ad hoc lessons culled from personal experience are
giving way to more systematic approaches.”   Our goal is to
contribute to this growing body of knowledge as well as learn from
it.  We are fortunate to be working in the Washington, DC region
where a significant amount of this work is underway.
We also realized that agreeing on a definition was not nearly as
important as understanding the characteristics of successful
capacity building investments.  We asked McKinsey & Company,
one of our strategic advisors, to identify examples of successful
capacity building experiences at nonprofits across the country.  We
wanted to learn from those experiences in order to refine our own
investment model and share those insights with others.
The findings of the McKinsey team are not altogether surprising.
They confirm what many in the social sector recognized - that
capacity building is both important and difficult.   This report
builds on that knowledge by clarifying and broadening the
definition of capacity building.  The findings of this report
represent a collective body of information that we believe will be
useful to the social, public and private sectors. 
In addition to the study, McKinsey developed a capacity
assessment tool for nonprofits.  We believe this tool will help
nonprofit leaders and staff gauge where they are in their organiza-
tional lives and identify for themselves their capacity building
needs. 
Preface 
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We hope this report will benefit several important communities.
For foundations and individual investors, we hope these findings
will bring greater clarity and understanding of the value of capacity
building and its essential role in allowing nonprofits to achieve
their mission.  For organizations that want to improve the breadth
and depth of their work, this report offers practical lessons from
others as well as tools and guidance on self-evaluation that can
help prepare them to receive capacity building support.   We share
the expectation with these communities that together we can help
good ideas become great programs that will bring significant social
gain and will improve the lives of many.
Mario Morino
Chairman of the Board
Gary F. Jonas
Managing Partner
Venture Philanthropy Partners, Inc.
Preface
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We would not have been able undertake this effort without the
involvement of many organizations and individuals, whom we
thank for their support.
The willingness of the organizations profiled in this report to
share their capacity building experiences was absolutely critical.
Individuals at each organization dedicated time, energy, and
thoughtfulness to the effort, and we are grateful for the
opportunity to learn from them.  Although we spoke with many
people, we especially thank Martha Pickett (America’s Second
Harvest), Winston Burton (Building Opportunities for Self-
Sufficiency), Dr. Michael Carrera (Children’s Aid Society), Donna
Lawrence and Maureen Cogan (Children’s Defense Fund – New
York), Ned Rimer and Eric Schwarz (Citizen Schools), Michael
Brown, Alan Khazei, and John Kalafatas (City Year), Michael
Coda and David Williamson (The Nature Conservancy), Greg
Tuke (Powerful Schools), Rick Aubry (Rubicon Programs, Inc.),
David Erickson (Samaritan Inns), Don Pemberton (Take Stock in
Children), Chris Stone (Vera Institute of Justice), and Patti Skelton
(Youth Eastside Services). 
We are also grateful to those funding organizations that helped us
identify and contact nonprofit organizations in their portfolios,
specifically the Robin Hood Foundation, New Profit, Inc.,
Roberts Enterprise Development Fund, Social Venture Partners,
and the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation.
In addition, we benefited from the thoughtful insights and
feedback of a number of individuals during the development of
this report, including Bill Shore (Community Wealth Ventures),
Michael Bailin (Edna McConnell Clark Foundation), Professor
Allen Grossman (Harvard Business School), Dr. Christine Letts
(Kennedy School of Government), Lisa Sullivan (LISTEN, Inc.),
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Kelly Fitzsimmons and Vanessa Kirsch (New Profit, Inc.), Melinda
Tuan and Jed Emerson (Roberts Enterprise Development Fund),
Carrie Abramson, David Saltzman and Lisa Smith (Robin Hood
Foundation), Jacqueline Novogratz (Rockefeller Foundation), Paul
Shoemaker and Azania Andrews (Social Venture Partners), and  Dr.
Gregory Dees (Stanford University)
We  conducted this project in partnership with Venture Philan-
thropy Partners (VPP), and we would like to thank VPP’s Mario
Morino, Gary Jonas and Sandra Gregg for their valuable contri-
butions and support.  The McKinsey team members who
conducted the research and developed the capacity framework and
findings in this report were Les Silverman, Lynn Taliento, Heiner
Baumann, David Salinas, Rebecca McCabe, and Mariano Baños.
We are especially appreciative of the organizations that send us
photographs of their work and the people they serve to help
illustrate this report.
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As nonprofit organizations play increasingly important roles in our
society, it becomes even more critical for them to perform
effectively.  In response, nonprofit managers have demonstrated a
growing interest in management practices and principles that will
help them build high-performing organizations, rather than just
strong programs.  Traditional foundations and venture philan-
thropists have also professed a new commitment to investing in the
organizational capacity of the nonprofits that they fund.
Despite this new emphasis on the importance of nonprofit
“capacity building,” the sector lacks a widely shared definition of
the term.  There is also precious little information about what
works and what does not in building organizational capacity in
nonprofits.  This is largely due to the sector’s historic inattention to
capacity building, which has not been adequately supported by
funders and has been of secondary importance to nonprofit
managers trying to deliver programs and services to people who
need them.  This situation is changing, and more funders are
dedicating attention and financial support to organizational
capacity.  A growing community of individuals nationally and in
the Washington D.C. region are committed to capacity building
and are engaged in an exciting dialogue around the topic.
In partnership with Venture Philanthropy Partners (VPP) and in
collaboration with several other philanthropic organizations and
sector experts, McKinsey & Company launched a project to
contribute to this dialogue.  We set out to develop a definition of
nonprofit organizational “capacity” as well as an easy-to-use tool
for assessing it.  We also sought to capture valuable lessons from
organizations that have engaged in successful capacity building.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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To these ends, we conducted case studies of 13 nonprofit organi-
zations that have engaged in capacity building efforts within the
past decade.  These groups span the spectrum of size and mission
from The Nature Conservancy ($780 million in revenues, 3,000
employees) to the school improvement organization Powerful
Schools ($700,000 budget, 14 staff).  In keeping with Venture
Philanthropy Partner’s focus, about half of the organizations
studied were involved in youth services or education.  
Each organization had also completed or was in the process of
completing a substantial capacity building exercise, and these
exercises were driven by a range of capacity builders, from venture
philanthropists to consultants to the organizations themselves.  It is
important to note that this group of organizations does not
represent a “top 10” list of organizations, nor does the report
attempt to describe the best efforts at capacity building from across
the sector. Similarly, the report does not compare or evaluate
different funding models or provide a step-by-step recipe for
building nonprofit capacity.
The report does, however, present a clear framework for defining
capacity (see exhibit on page 36) as well as a tool for measuring an
organization’s capacity level (see Appendix).  We believe that the
framework and capacity assessment grid will provide nonprofit
managers with a practical and useful way to understand and track
their own organization’s capacity, and then develop plans to
improve it.
The report also shares the lessons learned from nonprofits that
have engaged in successful capacity building efforts.  Finally, the
report captures three general lessons about capacity building that
we learned by looking across the 13 case study organizations.
Executive Summary
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The first lesson is that the act of resetting aspirations and strategy
is often the first step in dramatically improving an organization’s
capacity. The nonprofits in this study that experienced the greatest
gains in capacity were those that undertook a reassessment of their
aspirations – their vision of what the organization was attempting
to accomplish in the next phase of its development – and their
strategy. It is important to emphasize that a new aspiration or
strategy can only be transformative if it is then used to align the
other aspects of organizational capacity.  If done thoroughly, this
alignment process provides a tight institutional focus and a road
map for the organization to use with both internal and external
audiences, which help keep everyone on track during the long and
difficult process of building capacity.
The second lesson is the importance of good management.
Nonprofits need people in senior positions who are committed to
taking the initiative to make capacity building happen and are
willing to “own” it and drive it down through the organization.
Progress in effectively resetting aspirations and strategy, institution-
alizing sound management processes, and improving systems to
work at scale requires managerial ability as well as good
leadership.  What organizations facing these circumstances often
need is a chief operating officer – a trained professional manager
who can ensure that the organization functions efficiently and
effectively.  
The third lesson is that you must have patience.  Almost everything
about building capacity in nonprofits (and in for-profit companies)
takes longer and is more complicated than one would expect.
Building capacity can feel like a never-ending process because
improvements in one area or practice have a way of placing
unexpected new demands on other areas, which in turn trigger new
needs.  There are few quick fixes when it comes to building
capacity, and both nonprofit managers and those supporting them
need to acknowledge this up front and set expectations accordingly.
Executive Summary
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Where do these lessons leave us?  While the benefits of capacity
may be compelling, the actual effort of building capacity can seem
daunting indeed.  It can be hard for the nonprofit manager to fund,
hard to launch, and hard to implement.  It takes a long time and
the need is not always apparent to staff, volunteers, board
members, or donors.  It is therefore critical that in our roles as
nonprofit funders, board members, staff and advisors, we support
nonprofit managers in their efforts to build organizational capacity.
For their part, nonprofit managers need to take on the difficult and
often painful task of assessing their own capacity and identifying
the gaps that need to be filled.  The sooner we begin to collaborate
on the challenging task of capacity building, the better off
nonprofits – and society as a whole – will be.
Executive Summary
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Nonprofit organizations are justly admired for theirpassionate commitment to mission and their inventiveapproaches to addressing urgent social problems. Across
the country and around the world, nonprofits are implementing
programs that are improving the quality of life for tens of millions
of people, and they are often doing so against heavy odds and with
very limited resources.
The success that nonprofits have demonstrated in addressing social
issues has generated increased demand for their services.
Government is increasingly turning to nonprofits as potential
service providers and partners in tackling our most pressing social
issues.  We now recognize that most of these issues –  such as
hunger, homelessness, or environmental conservation – will not be
“solved” in our lifetime, and therefore will require strong organi-
zations to continue to address them.  Nonprofits have an obligation
to seek new and ever more effective ways of making tangible
progress toward their missions, and this requires building organiza-
tional capacity.  
All too many nonprofits, however, focus on creating new programs
and keeping administrative costs low instead of building the
organizational capacity necessary to achieve their aspirations
effectively and efficiently.  This is not surprising, given that donors
and funders have traditionally been more interested in supporting
an exciting new idea than in building an organization that can
effectively carry out that idea.  This must change; both nonprofit
managers and those that fund them must recognize that excellence
in programmatic innovation and implementation are insufficient
for nonprofits to achieve lasting results.  Great programs need great
organizations behind them.  As the leaders of Samaritan Inns
learned, the only way to build a great organization is to build
capacity.
INTRODUCTION
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When the crack cocaine epidemic of the mid-1980s blazedits destructive path through the inner-city communitiesof Washington, D.C., the newspaper headlines focused
on the sensational: Washington, murder capital of the world, Beirut
on the Potomac. 
Largely overlooked was the lasting damage that crack inflicted on
the families in Washington’s poorest neighborhoods.  It was not
just the murder rate that soared; equally disturbing was a
concomitant explosion in the city’s population of drug addicts,
many of them homeless.  These victims of crack, caught up in a
pernicious cycle of dependency and vagrancy, faced the future with
little hope either for themselves or for their communities.
Troubled by fiscal shortfalls and a complex political context, the
D.C. city government responded ineffectually to this crisis.  It
targeted the bulk of its drug rehabilitation resources on funding 28-
day treatment programs that were administered by participating
local hospitals.  Scant attention was paid to people once they had
graduated from these treatment programs, with the all-too-
predictable result that many soon slipped back into their old
patterns of drug addiction and homelessness.
Where government failed, however, the nonprofit sector saw
opportunity.  In 1986, David Erickson, a District-area social
activist, created a new nonprofit organization called Samaritan
Inns, focused expressly on serving the needs of this population.
The purpose of this new organization was to rebuild the lives of
addicted, homeless people by providing them with structures of
support and accountability. 
PARABLE: FROM CRISIS TO 
OPPORTUNITY AT SAMARITAN INNS
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To achieve this goal, Samaritan Inns offered temporary housing and
rehabilitation services to the homeless and addicted.  Samaritan
Inns would pick up where the city’s rehabilitation programs left off:
taking in clients as they finished hospital-operated rehab programs,
providing them with 6 months of assisted living, and then moving
them into single room occupancy (SRO) facilities for up to another
full year.  During these 6-month and 1-year phases, Samaritan Inns
would work with clients to maintain their commitment to stay
drug-free and to provide them with skills and counseling to
improve their chances of finding employment and reintegrating
successfully into society.
Erickson’s model worked, and Samaritan Inns grew robustly for a
decade.  By 1995, the 23 members of the Samaritan Inns staff were
serving 280 people a year in three temporary housing facilities and
two SRO facilities, with an annual budget of $750,000.  To be
sure, it suffered from many of the afflictions common to relatively
small, locally focused nonprofits – archaic, paper-based customer
tracking and reporting systems, for example, as well as an overly
narrow fund-raising base.  But Samaritan Inns was nonetheless
widely recognized in the Washington area for the quality of its
leadership and the effectiveness of its programs.
The future looked bright and stable for Samaritan Inns until a
fateful decision by the District government in 1996 to discontinue
funding most 28-day rehabilitation programs at city hospitals.
Overnight, the organization’s supply of clients evaporated.  And
because Samaritan Inns’ business model depended on access to a
steady stream of people leaving established rehabilitation
programs, the entire enterprise was now at risk.  What to do?
Erickson and his staff did not panic; instead they carefully explored
the full variety of options to respond to the crisis. These options
ranged from partnering with another organization to paying
someone else to provide rehabilitation services to going into the
rehabilitation business itself.  In essence, this last option would
mean insourcing the intensive recovery phase that had previously
been administered by hospitals.
Parable: From Crisis to 
Opportunity at 
Samaritan Inns
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After much deliberation, Samaritan Inns settled on the latter
course.  Insourcing rehab programs, Erickson’s team decided,
would provide an “end-to-end” solution that would give Samaritan
Inns control across the entire value chain, that is, the entire process
by which a client receives treatment, all the way from diagnosis to
rehabilitation and independent living.  This would allow Samaritan
Inns to influence all of the programs that affected the final
outcomes for clients. 
Insourcing would have two other major benefits.  First, because
Samaritan Inns would no longer depend on hospitals for referrals,
it would ensure a consistent supply of participants for the other
two phases of the program. Second, a unified, three-phase
approach offered a far more coherent model for replication outside
of Washington.
Having had the institutional fortitude and strategic vision to seek
opportunity in crisis, Samaritan Inns still faced the enormous
challenge of building its organizational capacity to meet the
demands of its new strategy.  It had no experience in running
intensive rehabilitation programs, and needed to add staff with
those skills.  It did not have either the systems or the infrastructure
required to manage an endeavor on the scale that Erickson now
envisaged. And it needed more money – lots more money.
As a consequence, Samaritan Inns undertook a systematic capacity
building effort to address each of these gaps, all under the umbrella
of the “New Hope Initiative.”  It tackled its immediate funding
needs by establishing a short-term development board to raise
money within Washington business circles.  These fund-raising
efforts got a further boost from a pro bono consulting project that
quantified the “social return on investment” of Samaritan Inns.
This project provided a rigorous, quantitative, third-party
endorsement of the organization’s results, making the entire
program more attractive to donors.  And Samaritan Inns worked
hard to improve its skills and systems, particularly in the area of
information technology.




The results of the New Hope Initiative have been impressive.  By
2001, Samaritan Inns was operating a comprehensive, three-phase
program to combat addiction and homelessness, composed of one
28-day rehabilitation facility, five temporary assisted-living
facilities, and three SRO facilities. The New Hope Initiative fund-
raising campaign raised $6.5 million to underwrite these new
facilities.
Meanwhile, the annual capacity of the program had grown to 600
individuals a year, more than double its previous amount, while the
staff had grown to 40 and the budget was close to $2 million.
Perhaps most significantly, Samaritan Inns is now poised to take its
three-phase approach to scale – to replicate its success in other
communities that face similar problems in breaking the cycle of
addiction and homelessness. 
Parable: From Crisis to 
Opportunity at 
Samaritan Inns
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Nonprofits, just like businesses, need to focus on buildingthe capacity of their entire organization if they want tomaximize their social impact.  Both board and staff need
to dedicate themselves to raising capacity building to the same level
of importance and attention as program development and
management – to think early and often about strengthening the
organization in lockstep with implementing programs. What
propelled Samaritan Inns (and other leading nonprofits) to new
levels of effectiveness was not any single initiative, but rather a
deliberate program to enhance its capabilities at all levels, from its
strategy to its systems and structure.  These efforts in turn
improved its ability to deliver against its aspirations.
Many organizations in the independent sector, especially smaller
groups or recently founded institutions, continue to neglect
building organizational capacity in favor of developing and
deploying programs.  Why?  What barriers prevent nonprofits from
embracing a more holistic view of their enterprises?
At one level, the tendency among nonprofits to favor program
makes perfect sense.  Most nonprofits are founded by intensely
motivated individuals who are promoting a new idea:  a different
approach, method, or system to address some pressing social need.
In the case of Samaritan Inns, for example, the programmatic
innovation was the focus on providing post-rehabilitation housing
and counseling for addicts.  Of necessity, the start-up phase for
many nonprofits revolves around testing, refining, and
implementing its new idea, with the majority of the organization’s
resources dedicated to that task.  In addition, many nonprofits
aspire to achieve their missions in the not-too-distant future, so
why should they invest in capacity?  Finally, building capacity can
be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive in the short run, and
most nonprofit managers would prefer to spend their dollars on
programs.
WHY CAPACITY BUILDING MATTERS – 
AND WHY NONPROFITS IGNORE IT
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But other obstacles also face nonprofit boards or managers seeking
to build capacity.  For example, nonprofit culture tends to glorify
program work over “back-office” functions or even higher-level
institutional functions such as strategic planning.  (In fact, in many
for-profit and nonprofit organizations, “planning” is something of
a dirty word, as it distracts from important day-to-day activities.)
In addition, many nonprofit managers are generally skeptical about
the relevance of business practices to nonprofit organizations.   
Another important barrier impeding the ability of nonprofits to
engage in capacity building is a dysfunctional funding environment.
Every nonprofit manager knows that a majority of donors, both
individuals and foundations, like to earmark their contributions to
support particular projects or programs.  The easiest dollars to
raise have always been for “bricks and mortar” capital campaigns,
with very tangible products, while the hardest have been for
general administrative costs – including efforts to build organiza-
tional capacity.  Donors fear that such contributions will serve only
to hire more staff or perpetuate the institution rather than make an
impact on the mission.  The rise of new forms of funding, partic-
ularly venture philanthropy, has begun to lower this barrier, but
given the idiosyncrasies of many major donors, it seems unlikely
that this perspective will change dramatically any time soon.
Nonprofits have also been hampered in their capacity building
efforts by a simple lack of knowledge.  For inspiration and new
ideas in an area such as fundraising, for example, nonprofits can
look for guidance to a whole body of literature, the experiences of
other organizations, and a robust specialty consulting market.  But
when it comes to nonprofit capacity building, there is no shared
conceptual framework or approach that can be applied widely
across the sector.
Why Capacity Building 
Matters – and 
Why Nonprofits 
Ignore It
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Finally – and maybe most important – establishing a direct linkage
between building capacity and increased social impact has proved
elusive. In a few cases, certainly, the connection is readily apparent.
A food bank that improves its inventory management, for example,
will deliver more food to more people more quickly.  But far more
often, it is difficult if not impossible to attribute increased impact to
a particular capacity building effort.  Take the case of Samaritan
Inns, which hired an expert in 28-day rehabilitation programs as
part of its overall initiative to build capacity.  This individual
clearly played a big role in revitalizing the institution, but how can
we measure his specific contribution relative to all the other
external factors – legal, economic, social – which influenced
Samaritan Inns during this period? 
These barriers are formidable but not insurmountable.  The profes-
sionalization of nonprofit management as well as changes in the
funding climate will continue to nudge nonprofit culture toward a
more enlightened view of capacity building. As more organizations
begin to address capacity building systematically, better
information and improved measures will surface to make a more
convincing connection between capacity building initiatives and
social impact.  
Make no mistake, although the link between increased capacity
and increased impact may be hard to quantify, one does lead to the
other.  The executive directors of the organizations profiled in this
report testify that their capacity building efforts were critical
ingredients in their increased social impact, though in every case
there were other contributing factors as well.  For the nonprofit
sector as a whole to achieve a greater social impact, more organi-
zations must address their gaps in organizational capacity.  Having
honed their model or their program, they need to invest the
necessary time and effort in building their organizational capacity
to deliver that program more effectively and efficiently or to
replicate their success in other locations. Unless they do, they will
never be capable of fulfilling their promise.  
Why Capacity Building 




Many managers and volunteers of small organizations or single-site
programs take issue with this assertion.  They argue that an organi-
zation created to tackle a specific problem at a specific place does
not need, nor can it afford, to undertake extensive capacity
building initiatives.  Why would a local soup kitchen need a state-
of-the-art information system or a homeless shelter a mission
statement? 
Although it is certainly true that the capacity needs of such
operations are less than those of a large, multisite organization, any
institution can benefit from a capacity building exercise.  Some
soup kitchens, for example, do in fact have advanced information
systems, which allow them to track inventory, order efficiently
from food banks, and manage food-rescue programs.  The
objective of any nonprofit should be to achieve the maximum
social impact, not just to have some social impact.
The case studies discussed in this report validate the focus of
venture philanthropists and other funders who have sought to
maximize the leverage from their charitable donations by
emphasizing nonprofit capacity building.  Their desire to increase
impact is understandable and well founded.  Given the enormity
and urgency of the issues that society faces, nonprofit donors can
legitimately demand that organizations undertake systematic
capacity building efforts to increase their effectiveness, secure in the
knowledge that investments in capacity bear long-term fruit in the
form of higher social impact. 
Why Capacity Building 
Matters – and 
Why Nonprofits 
Ignore It
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If building capacity is vital to the long-term health andeffectiveness of nonprofit institutions, both large and small,how then can we determine the capacity gaps of a particular
nonprofit?  Are there common threads, common issues, a common
framework for assessing capacity that cut across the full spectrum
of nonprofit activity?
Capacity is one of those words that mean all things to all people,
and nonprofits have approached and interpreted capacity building
in many different ways.  As a starting point, therefore, the team
developed a “Capacity Framework” to provide a common vision
and vocabulary for nonprofit capacity.
The Capacity Framework (see Exhibit on page 36), defines
nonprofit capacity in a pyramid of seven essential elements: three
higher-level elements – aspirations, strategy, and organizational
skills – three foundational elements – systems and infrastructure,
human resources, and organizational structure – and a cultural
element which serves to connect all the others.  The team defined
these elements as follows:
 Aspirations: An organization’s mission, vision, and overar-
ching goals, which collectively articulate its common
sense of purpose and direction
 Strategy: The coherent set of actions and programs
aimed at fulfilling the organization’s overarching goals 
 Organizational Skills: The sum of the organization’s capa-
bilities, including such things (among others) as perform-
ance measurement, planning, resource management,
and external relationship building
 Human Resources: The collective capabilities, experi-
ences, potential and commitment of the organization’s
board, management team, staff, and volunteers
THE CAPACITY FRAMEWORK
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 Systems and Infrastructure: The organization’s planning,
decision making, knowledge management, and adminis-
trative systems, as well as the physical and technological
assets that support the organization
 Organizational Structure: The combination of governance,
organizational design, interfunctional coordination, and
individual job descriptions that shapes the organization’s
legal and management structure
 Culture: The connective tissue that binds together the
organization, including shared values and practices,
behavior norms, and most important, the organization’s
orientation towards performance.
By combining all the different elements of organizational capacity
in a single, coherent diagram, the pyramid emphasizes the
importance of examining each element both individually and in
relation to the other elements, as well as in context of the whole
enterprise.  These emphases reflect a key finding of the research:
many nonprofits tend to think capacity building is limited to
“technical assistance” or improving the effectiveness of functions at
the bottom of the pyramid – human resources or organizational
structure, for example.
In fact, the case studies suggest that the greatest gains in social
impact came when organizations engaged in capacity building
efforts that were aligned within the pyramid.  As in the case of
Samaritan Inns, the organization’s systems were most effective
when integrated both with other lower-level capacity elements such
as structure and human resources and with the higher-level
elements of aspirations, strategies, and skills.  Prudent nonprofit
managers are therefore well advised to consider the 
organizationwide impact of an initiative designed to build capacity
in one element and plan accordingly.  Certainly, nonprofits need
not attempt to fix all of the elements of capacity at once – such an
effort would undoubtedly lead to institutional paralysis for the
duration of the project.  By the same token, they must be aware
that capacity building cannot be undertaken in isolation.  Far better
to extend capacity building started in one element to the most
pertinent interconnected capacity elements.
The Capacity Framework
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The team also developed the Capacity Assessment Grid (see
Appendix), a diagnostic tool to measure an organization’s strength
along each capacity element in the Capacity Framework. In essence,
this grid enables an organization to determine where it stands along
the continuum of best practices for each element of capacity.  A
nonprofit manager can use the grid to map her organization’s
institutional evolution along each area – board, fund-raising,
information systems, and so forth.  We tested the grid with nearly a
dozen nonprofit executive directors, all of whom found the exercise
illuminating and relevant.  In the appendix, we go into greater
detail about how nonprofits can use this tool and how to interpret

















The seven elements of nonprofit capacity are closelyconnected, and organizations need to do some seriousstrategic thinking about which element of capacity to build
first.  Nonetheless, each element is distinct.  Let us now discuss
each element, using case studies from the research to illustrate the
key themes.
ASPIRATIONS
Influenced by corporate models, many nonprofits have adopted the
standard “mission, vision, goals” structure in articulating the big-
picture objectives of their enterprises.  In the best organizations,
these three concepts are described in clear, succinct statements of
one or two sentences each, with the goals expressed in precise,
measurable terms.  In less disciplined organizations, the
descriptions can run on for pages.  To discuss these concepts – and
because mission, vision, and goals all reflect aspects of overall
organizational purpose – we bundled these three elements under
the term “aspirations” in developing the Capacity Framework.   
Nonprofits need to spend time and effort evaluating and articu-
lating their aspirations. Aspirations inspire staff, volunteers, and
donors. They define what an organization will do – and won’t do.
They help define an organization’s overall approach and set
priorities for action.  They are a basis for strategy, which in turn
defines the necessary organizational skills that can be delivered
only with the proper design of human resources, systems, and
organizational structure. In short, aspirations drive everything.
According to our findings, the organizations that made the greatest
gains in social impact were those which tackled high-level questions
of mission, vision, and goals. 
THE SEVEN ELEMENTS 
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THE NATURE CONSERVANCY
The Nature Conservancy, the nation’s largest private conservation
group, provides an excellent case of how aligning an organization’s
aspirations can enhance its impact.  Under the leadership of John
Sawhill, a former McKinsey partner and senior government official,
the Conservancy undertook no less than three major capacity
building initiatives during the 1990s, all focused on aspirations-
level issues.  One effort rewrote the mission statement; the second
produced a new conservation vision and approach; and the third
set concrete organizationwide goals.
On the surface, the organization that Sawhill inherited in 1990 was
thriving, having posted record revenues, membership, and number
of acres acquired.  The organization’s basic strategy – protecting
rare species of plants and animals by buying land – was time-
honored and very attractive to donors.  Despite these successes the
Conservancy’s organizational design harbored a flaw that was
diluting its social impact. 
Although legally a single 501(c)3 entity, the Conservancy looked
and behaved more like a federation, with each autonomous state
office setting its goals and priorities separately and raising its own
operating funds. As a result, it was very difficult to allocate
resources effectively, to mobilize resources for institutionwide
priorities, or to assess organizationwide progress toward the
mission. With no common objective for the entire enterprise,
operating units found it difficult to cooperate on conservation
initiatives that crossed multiple geopolitical boundaries.
The lack of internal cooperation was especially troublesome
because advances in conservation science were driving the organi-
zation to rethink its basic conservation approach.  In particular, it
was clear that the mission demanded that the Conservancy protect
land on much larger scales than ever, making the old capital-
intensive approach of buying and managing natural areas 
The Seven Elements 
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economically unfeasible over the long term.  The future of conser-
vation would depend upon cross-border collaboration and
partnership – qualities notably lacking from the Conservancy’s
organizational skill base.  Sawhill recognized that the Conservancy
would never reach its potential until it started to act as a single
institution. 
Preaching the gospel of “One Conservancy,” Sawhill was careful to
work with and not against his organization’s fiercely independent
culture in rolling out his capacity building initiatives.  He
recognized that the organization would balk at any heavy-handed,
top-down effort, and so from the start, he appealed to the organi-
zation’s competitiveness, challenging it to raise the bar and increase
its collective impact.  Even the most independent-minded managers
couldn’t argue with that.  From there, it was not such a great leap
to secure organizational consensus that the best way to the next
level of effectiveness was to focus all of the Conservancy’s resources
on a common vision, conservation approach, and set of goals.
Nailing down the exact details of the vision and approach was an
agonizing, lengthy process.  Many parts of the organization resisted
surrendering local control, even in exchange for increased impact.
But by 2000, after a decade of capacity building, the Conservancy
had executed a remarkable makeover.  Where once its mission,
vision, goals, and strategies were completely disjointed, now the
Conservancy has attained a large degree of strategic alignment,
with every operating unit aware of its role in advancing the overall
objectives of the organization.
These efforts at aligning the Conservancy’s aspirations have had a
dramatic impact on its conservation effectiveness.  Having aligned
aspirations, the Conservancy was able to develop new 
organizationwide initiatives such as Last Great Places, improve the
recruiting and retention of top talent, and conduct more
coordinated and aggressive fund-raising campaigns.  As a result, in
the decade since John Sawhill started down the capacity building
path, the Conservancy has improved its performance on
Aspirations
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biodiversity indicators, and its revenues, staff, and number of
offices have tripled.  Membership has more than doubled.  Its
traditional land protection activity – both through acquisition and
other protection tools, including partnerships – now exceeds a
million acres a year.  Thanks to the unified goals and the common
vision of success, the protection programs focus only on lands
identified as organizationwide priorities.  The Conservancy
continues to expand rapidly, and is already well on its way to its
goal of launching 500 new large-scale project offices by 2010.
The Conservancy is hardly unique, however, in having realized
large impact gains from capacity building at the aspirational level.
For instance, by including outcome measures such as “to decrease
the Florida dropout rate by 1 percent” in its aspirations, Take
Stock in Children, a Florida-based mentoring and scholarship
program, simultaneously raised the bar and focused the efforts of
that organization.  Meanwhile, as the direct result of a donor-
driven initiative to increase organizational capacity, America’s
Second Harvest, the nation’s largest anti-hunger group, recently
changed its mission from feeding the hungry to creating a hunger-
free America.  This aspirational shift has in turn compelled Second
Harvest to become aggressively engaged in advocacy work, and
with positive results.  By exploiting the political clout of its
network of local food banks, Second Harvest has been able to
influence the resources allocated to federal food programs, thereby
greatly leveraging its own impact.
The Seven Elements 
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STRATEGY
If a nonprofit’s aspirations describe at a high level what the organi-
zation wishes to achieve – its purpose and objectives – strategy
represents the means for reaching those aspirations.  Optimally,
organizations will implement strategies that are coherent, well
integrated, and linked directly to an organization’s major goals.
More than simply the sum of an organization’s activities, well-
conceived strategies should build on a nonprofit’s core
competencies, allocate resources to priorities, and help delineate its
unique point of differentiation.
Capacity building efforts that focus on the strategy component
have typically sought to align an organization’s strategies with its
aspirations.  This exercise serves a dual purpose:  on the one hand,
it can play a useful role in helping eliminate programs of limited
mission impact, while on the other it allows organizations to take
advantage of changed circumstances or new opportunities. But
strategies also have been aligned with the rest of the organization –
with skills, human resources, and so forth – to ensure the greatest
chance of making a positive social impact. 
TAKE STOCK IN CHILDREN
Consider the case of Take Stock in Children (TSIC), a Florida-
based organization committed to reducing the high school dropout
rate of children in Florida’s public schools.  Originally created as a
program for the Pinellas County Education Foundation (PCEF) in
1991, the idea behind TSIC was to pair an at-risk elementary or
middle school child with an adult mentor for one hour a week.
Participants who stuck with the program throughout their school
careers – and who maintained good grades while staying in school,
drug-free, and out of trouble – were guaranteed college
scholarships. 
“We came to the conclu-
sion that we had some-
thing unique and impor-
tant to offer to the chil-
dren and the communities
of this state, and if we do
not seize the opportunity
at hand, it might not come
again.  The cost of such
rapid expansion was
uneven program quality;
the benefit was that we
established a new social
enterprise that filled an
important need.”
— Don Pemberton,
Take Stock in Children
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The strong interest in the TSIC program emboldened PCEF’s
director, Don Pemberton, to launch a separate TSIC foundation to
house the program and begin statewide program expansion in
1995.  Ninety-four percent of its first class completed the program
and 80 percent of those students are still in college.  Although these
numbers were not yet available in 1995, Pemberton knew, based on
his intensive experience and research, that the program would be
very effective.  Through a timely partnership with Barnett Bank, the
largest bank in the state, and particularly because of the
commitment of Barnett’s chief executive, Charlie Rice, TSIC was
able to undergo a period of explosive growth by forging alliances
with local organizations willing to manage the TSIC program and
local companies willing to support the organization.  In the space
of less than 10 months, TSIC expanded from a single entity to an
operation with 31 locally managed affiliates servicing nearly 50
counties across the state.  
Not surprisingly, however, this aggressive growth strategy brought
with it a host of serious management issues.  Without strong
infrastructure and oversight – the consequence of inadequate
capacity, caused by rapid growth – the quality of program delivery
varied significantly with the capacity of the local partner. Similarly,
some of the local partners experienced operational funding
shortfalls, while TSIC lacked the systems to monitor its
performance in any systematic fashion. 
In 1997, Pemberton tackled these intertwined problems with a
comprehensive capacity building effort to create a new operating
strategy facilitated by an outside consulting firm.  This effort began
by clarifying TSIC’s aspirations, which in turn formed the basis for
the strategies to be developed and the related capabilities, people,
systems, and structure that would be required.  In addition to a
refined mission and goal for TSIC (to reduce Florida’s statewide
dropout rate by 1 percent), this effort resulted in new performance
measures applicable across all TSIC locations, an expanded, more
professional staff with new skills, a new organizational structure
and management processes, and targeted strategies for fund-raising
and mentor recruitment.
The Seven Elements 
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Together these changes, affecting virtually all aspects of TSIC,
constitute an entirely new business model and strategy for
achieving its mission.  The results speak for themselves.  The
number of children served has grown to 5,800 – a growth rate of
830 percent since 1995.  A new board legislative committee, for
example, has secured for TSIC an annual appropriation of $3
million from the state legislature, helping boost total annual
revenues to $15.2 million.  The headquarters staff has grown from
3 to 13, enabling far better quality control over affiliates, which
themselves employ an additional 70 full-time staff.  This network
of partner organizations, meanwhile, has now reached 40, working
in 54 counties.  
Other nonprofits have proved as willing as Take Stock in Children
to reassess their organizational strategies in the interests of
improving impact and adjusting to new conditions.  Youth Eastside
Services (YES), a Seattle-area organization that reaches out to
troubled teenagers, has taken advantage of the powerful technology
presence in its community by building the technology infrastructure
necessary to be able to leverage the Internet to reach new and
existing clients with YES’s programs and services.
Meanwhile, before entering the highly competitive market in youth
services in New York, the Children’s Defense Fund – New York
(CDF-NY) carefully devised an alliance-building strategy that
allowed it to tap into the strengths of existing organizations
without threatening them.  Through the clever strategy of focusing
on a narrow and uncontroversial issue (child health) and becoming
the acknowledged expert in that topic, CDF-NY not only managed
to avoid stepping on the toes of its colleagues, but in fact was able
to add value to the whole sector.  On the one hand, it introduced
new mechanisms and arenas of interaction between child-advocacy
groups in New York, and on the other hand, it helped leverage
federal funds that would be used to provide health insurance for




For many high-performing nonprofits, the most important
component of the value chain is the process through which they
develop, implement, fund, and measure programs.  Crafting a
successful process – one that increases social impact – draws on the
full range of an organization’s skills, from strategic planning to
marketing and fund-raising to program development and
execution.
Think of an organization that has a demonstrated record of success
in delivering a particular program, but has very limited skills in
such areas as financial management or program evaluation – a
common combination in the nonprofit sector.  This skill gap
inherently compromises the ability to improve and expand services
to more clients. Donors and government agencies, for example, will
be reluctant to dedicate significant resources to an enterprise with
weak financial controls. Similarly, organizations that do not
rigorously evaluate and measure the effectiveness of their programs
have a hard time demonstrating the kind of tangible results that
inspire donors.
THE VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
Closing the skill gap – strengthening the full range of organiza-
tional skills required for mission success, thereby increasing impact
– has been the objective of a number of nonprofit capacity building
initiatives.  A telling case concerns the New York-based Vera
Institute of Justice, which seeks to make the justice system more
effective, humane, and just.  Founded in 1961, Vera specializes in
developing and testing innovative new approaches to issues of
criminal and social justice, and then transferring responsibility for
large-scale implementation to a government agency or a spinoff
nonprofit.
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In the mid 1990s, under the leadership of chief executive Chris
Stone, Vera completely redesigned its core business process to
ensure that it had appropriate skills and capacity to support each
step in its value chain, from planning to spinoff.  Over time Vera’s
definition of “justice” had expanded to include, for example,
environmental justice, so Stone started the redesign process by
restricting Vera’s programmatic focus to five closely related areas of
activity:  crime and victimization; policing; judicial process;
sentencing and corrections; and youth safety and justice.  This
focusing exercise not only helped ensure that Vera did not get
involved in efforts unrelated to its core competencies, but also
allowed the organization to focus its intellectual capital and skills
on a common set of problems.
Stone then turned to Vera’s value chain.  What made Vera effective?
Several things, it turned out.  Vera drew on high-quality research,
its proposals were innovative, and it had clear expertise in running
demonstration projects.  Vera had a lot of experience in taking
programs to scale, locally and nationally.  As a result, Vera had
amassed an impressive array of organizational skills – but was
underleveraging these assets because it lacked the critical project
management skills necessary to bind them together into a cohesive
whole.
To address this problem, Stone reorganized the entire enterprise
around a six-stage value chain, setting up separate departments for
each.  Research, for example, collects and analyzes data to inform
new projects and evaluate ongoing efforts. Planning develops ideas
for new programs and projects.  Demonstration takes the
innovations of the Planning team and translates them into on-the-
ground reality. The National Assistance group works to take
effective local-level demonstrations statewide or nationally, while
International Assistance applies Vera’s findings, experience, and
process to criminal justice issues overseas.  The last stage in the
process is Spinoffs, which is responsible for creating viable govern-
mental or nonprofit institutions to take on full-time implemen-
tation of successful Vera demonstration projects.
Organizational Skills
“In most public or nonprof-
it service organizations,
innovation is seen as a
luxury, not a necessity.




requires....  For us, invest-
ment in the process of
innovation itself provided
the crucial breakthrough
that allowed us to refine
and strengthen our core
capacities for new pro-
gram development.”
— Chris Stone,
Vera Institute of Justice
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Vera actively manages itself according to this process.  Every
quarter, for example, Stone delivers to his board a grid that
captures the current status of Vera projects and programs on a
single page.  Along the vertical axis are the five areas of program
activity; along the horizontal axis are the six stages of program
development.  At a glance, board members or managers can see
what project is at what stage of development.  Because the process
is explicitly articulated in terms of the different skills required for
each stage of project development, Vera has a near-automatic
mechanism for identifying and rectifying skill gaps.
Vera’s capacity gains appear to have translated into better social,
organizational, and financial performance.  Its retooled organiza-
tional process ensures a steady stream of new projects in the
pipeline – on average four new demonstration projects per year in
each of its five program areas, compared with only one before its
capacity building effort.  Each of these innovations, furthermore, is
better managed than before, with each project rigorously evaluated
at each stage in the process.  And Vera has been able to accelerate
its deliberate strategy of spinning off projects to other entities.
Before Stone arrived, Vera was spinning off a program about once
every 3 years on average; the organization is now averaging one
new spinoff every year.  During the past 8 years Vera’s net assets
have grown from $9 million to $26 million.
Vera’s experience underscores one additional point about building
organizational skills.  Many nonprofit managers interpret skills too
narrowly, thinking of them as the capabilities of a particular
individual rather than as organizational assets. The key to Vera’s
capacity leap and increased social impact was the recognition that
the most important part of its value chain was knowledge – its six-
step process for designing and implementing projects.  Vera could
then go out and acquire or build the skills it needed to excel at each
step in the process.
The Seven Elements 
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CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND – NEW YORK
By contrast, when the Children’s Defense Fund decided to enter the
highly competitive New York child advocacy sector, the skills CDF-
NY needed most related to nurturing partnerships and developing
alliances.  Some 5,000 separate organizations are involved in the
issues of child advocacy and child welfare to one degree or another.
For an outside organization, the situation was clearly fraught with
peril.  The opportunities to offend territorial, entrenched
constituencies were legion, while it was not at all obvious what
added value CDF-NY would bring to children’s issues in New
York. 
CDF-NY’s executive director, Donna Lawrence, and the deputy
director, Sandy Trujillo, immediately recognized that their best
chances of making an impact depended on cooperation, rather than
competition, with the other child advocacy organizations in New
York.  Consequently, starting in 1995 they launched three separate
initiatives intended to build a long-term, broad-based network of
mutually beneficial alliances between CDF-NY and a wide range of
partners, both public and nonprofit.  The idea was to rally parties
concerned with similar issues through deliberative, inclusive “win-
win” arrangements, actively engaging partners in CDF-NY’s
projects, and maintaining regular contact with them.  CDF-NY
could thereby create a coalition of partners that it could mobilize to
advance its institutional objectives.
Lawrence and Trujillo began by leveraging existing relationships
from previous jobs to assemble a coalition of city government
agencies, community-based organizations, and unions around a
CDF-NY initiative to increase the percentage of children getting
proper vaccines.  The success of this effort – the number of
vaccinated children in New York rose from 52 percent in 1995 to
85 percent today – not only helped establish CDF-NY’s credibility
in the child advocacy community, but also opened the eyes of
Lawrence and Trujillo to the opportunities for effective advocacy
that could come from mobilizing the coalition they had assembled.
Organizational Skills
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Drawing on its own network, and encouraging its partners to
leverage their own networks and resources, CDF-NY soon led the
fight in Congress to create the Children’s Health Insurance Program
(CHIP) and then played a key role in developing and implementing
New York’s CHIP program that has served as model for the rest of
the country.  The Federal Government subsequently committed
$2.5 billion over ten years to CHIP. 
CDF-NY’s commitment to building partnerships resonates in every
aspect of the organization.  When some perceived its relationship
with government as overly cozy, it diversified its base of partners by
reaching out to churches and day care centers. Working under the
principle that you can accomplish amazing things if you don’t care
who gets the credit, CDF-NY deliberately nurtured relationships
that gave partner organizations opportunities for ownership,
networking, and cross-fertilization.  And it maintains regular
contact with coalition members through meetings, a 30,000-
member mailing list, and mass faxes.
In retrospect, it is clear that key capacity building decision for
CDF-NY was to hire a management team with proven credentials
in New York and with the skills suitable to build a wide array of
partnerships and alliances.  Through exceptional inclusiveness and
skillful political navigating, Lawrence and Trujillo helped to unify a
diverse group of child advocacy organizations, thereby positioning
CDF-NY as a focal point and leader in the child advocacy
community.
The Seven Elements 
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HUMAN RESOURCES
People – professional staff, volunteers, board members – are the
lifeblood of any nonprofit organization.  An organization’s human
resources represent the collective capabilities and experiences of its
people, and yet nonprofit organizations not only are reluctant to
manage talent actively (especially compared to the private sector)
but they also tend to undervalue their people.  Yet, when organi-
zations succeed in attracting talented people and unleashing their
full potential, good things happen. This lesson comes through
clearly in the cases of Citizen Schools, Rubicon Programs, and
Powerful Schools, three organizations that focused on instituting
progressive human resources practices.
CITIZEN SCHOOLS
Citizen Schools (CS) is a Boston-based organization that seeks to
educate children and strengthen community ties through improved
after-school programs.  Its program quality depends critically on
the quality of the teaching staff and volunteers, which means
human resources is at the top of this organization’s capacity
building priorities.   
Citizen Schools was launched in 1995 by Ned Rimer and Eric
Schwarz, two social entrepreneurs fresh off a successful personal
experience teaching public school children first-aid and journalism.
They had seen what difference they could make in the lives of
children in a few short hours of their innovative after-school
program, but at the time Boston offered parents few high-quality or
affordable after-school options.
Schwarz and Rimer’s model for tackling this problem was based
around a cadre of “Citizen Teachers.”  These volunteers would
help children between the ages of 9 and 14 develop skills in such
areas as leadership, writing, public speaking, and using the
scientific method.  By framing these activities as “apprenticeships”
and making them fun and educational, Schwarz and Rimer felt that
Citizen Schools could meet an unserved need and at the same time
improve Boston’s poor educational testing results.  
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Citizen Schools quickly learned that a major challenge in the after-
school sector was attracting and recruiting enough talented part-
time teaching staff to populate the program.  Schwarz and Rimer
overcame this hurdle by creating an innovative employment model
that relied on staff-sharing agreements with several leading Boston-
area nonprofits. Citizen Schools designed 1- to 2-year full-time
positions, complete with benefits and professional development
opportunities, and branded them as a prestigious “Fellows
Program.”  Citizen Schools then sought and secured corporate
funding to underwrite the program.  Under this program, each
Fellow splits his or her time equally between Citizen Schools and
another nonprofit organization.  The Fellows now comprise one-
third of the Citizen Schools staff, which has risen sharply from 13
to its current level of 57.
Citizen Schools’ overall investments in capacity building –
including its focus on human resources – have been rewarded
handsomely. On the financial front, it has leveraged its new
strategic clarity and corporate partnerships into $3.5 million in
additional funding. The program is reaching many more children,
as well – from 560 in 1998 to more than 1,200 in 2000.  In terms
of social impact, Citizen Schools can point to some very promising
trends.  In early tests, for example, children who have gone through
Citizen Schools demonstrate significant improvements in writing
skills.  Furthermore, the product is in demand.  There has been a
50 percent increase in the number of licensed after-school slots in
the Boston schools since 1995; fully one-third of the increase is
attributable to Citizen Schools.
POWERFUL SCHOOLS
Other nonprofits have looked to external resources to build their
human resources capacity.  Powerful Schools, a Seattle-based
organization that provides comprehensive education programs for
small coalitions of public schools and community organizations, is
an example of an enterprise that quickly and cost-effectively
increased its human resources capacity by creating new volunteer
opportunities for its funders and other partners.  Powerful School’s
active management of volunteers has been a key driver in its
successful effort to build capacity and deliver its program.
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Powerful Schools was launched in 1992 by a group of parents and
principals concerned about the quality of Seattle’s public education.
Its initiatives involve mobilizing local resources – parents, writers,
and artists – to supplement the regular school curriculum and after-
school programs.  Then in 1998, Powerful Schools became a
founding member in the portfolio of Seattle’s Social Venture
Partners (SVP), which operates a volunteer model of venture
philanthropy in which the individual “Partners” donate at least
$5,000 annually for at least 2 years and lend their expertise to
capacity building projects at the portfolio organizations.  Each
portfolio organization selected by SVP receives a contribution of
between $24,000 and $109,000, in addition to the expertise
provided by SVP volunteers.
Powerful Schools’ alliance with SVP not only infused the organi-
zation with additional financial resources, but also brought a
dedicated team of volunteers with the expertise to tackle a whole
range of capacity building efforts.  As these efforts have come to
fruition over the past 3 years, Powerful Schools has been able to
expand its programs, organize new fund-raising events, implement
a technology plan, and devise a plan for replicating the Powerful
Schools model elsewhere. In 2000, Powerful Schools expanded its
program to two Seattle-area communities. Meanwhile, to provide
long-term funding for Powerful Schools, three SVP partners and the
chair of the organization’s board formed a development team to
explore earned-income strategies.  Thanks to SVP’s financial
support, the executive director of Powerful Schools was nominated
to participate in the Denali Initiative, a 3-year intense social
enterprise development program designed for leaders with




Rubicon Programs of Contra Costa County, California, is another
organization that has paid close attention to building its human
resources capacity. Rubicon’s mission is to help people who are
homeless, economically disadvantaged, or disabled achieve greater
independence and self-sufficiency. In the 30 years since its
founding, Rubicon has engaged in programs ranging from housing
and job-training services to mental health care and money
management. It also owns three social-purpose businesses that
employ low-income or disabled adults:  a bakery, a landscaping
service, and a home care business for the elderly and disabled.
These social-purpose businesses hold the key to Rubicon’s
innovative approach to human resources.  The bakery and other
businesses compete in the open marketplace, and consequently need
to be professionally run to be competitive.  Granted, profits are of
secondary importance to helping the client population, but
Rubicon cannot afford to allow these businesses to lose money. As
a consequence, Rubicon places great value on ensuring that it hires
professional staff with relevant business skills and experience –
M.B.A.s and the like.  What’s more, it compensates these people
well above the standard nonprofit rate, with its human resources
department conducting regular salary surveys of comparable jobs
in the Bay Area.
In addition to its competitive compensation policies and active
recruitment of talented staff, Rubicon has adopted other human
resources measures that draw heavily on best practices from the
for-profit sector.  It gives its managers a great deal of autonomy to
run their own departments and it carefully monitors performance.
All 280 Rubicon staff – managers and client-employees alike –
undergo a yearly evaluation process, with the results linked to an
incentive program of salary raises.  In addition – and unusually in
the nonprofit context – Rubicon has demonstrated a willingness to
terminate staff that do not meet its performance expectations.  As
one outside observer noted:  “Rubicon has tough standards; as a
result, they have very competent managers throughout the organi-
zation.”
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attract and retain strong
managers.  Management
really makes or breaks
nonprofits”
— Dr. Rick Aubry,
Rubicon Programs
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Rubicon’s enlightened approach to building human resources
capacity illustrates a number of important lessons about nonprofit
capacity building as a whole.  For one, external pressures – in this
case, competition – can help bring discipline and focus to the
capacity building process. Second, its success in recruiting and
retaining high-performing staff shows the value of nonprofits
adopting for-profit models.  Third, it demonstrates how building
capacity in one area (human resources in this case) spills over into
other areas of capacity.  To attract talented managers, for example,
Rubicon needed effective evaluation and incentive systems, as well
as an organizational structure that would give managers the
autonomy they craved.  As we have seen before, building the




Nonprofit managers often have an easier time understanding the
importance of capacity building in relation to systems and
infrastructure than they do with any other component of the
Capacity Framework.  At one level, this awareness reflects the fact
that systems failures are often visible, immediate, and embarrassing
for nonprofits – breakdowns such as sending a direct-mail solici-
tation to the chairman of the board of governors or using financial
systems that can’t generate timely reports.  Every nonprofit CEO
has encountered such frustrations personally and vowed to avoid
repeating them.  Building capacity to improve systems is therefore
rarely a hard sell internally.  
A harder task is to get nonprofits to think about building capacity
across the full range of systems that support the organization.  An
executive director can command the membership department “to
fix” a problem like unwanted solicitations of board members, but
that is not capacity building.  Indeed, fixing the original problem
without regard to other systems invariably spawns additional
problems.  By contrast, the enlightened executive will recognize
that such failures are symptomatic of deeper troubles in the organi-
zation, and will look instead at how the entire suite of systems
works (or does not work) together.
Within the context of the Capacity Framework, systems are the
processes, both formal and informal, by which the organization
functions – in short, how things work.  Nonprofit systems can be
complex, even mystifying, especially in relation to managing
decisions, knowledge, and people.  Systems are also one of the
more obvious levers of capacity, with nonprofits already
accustomed to seeking “technical assistance” from specialized
external third parties.  Infrastructure, meanwhile, describes the
assets that support the organization, both physical and techno-
logical.  Although infrastructure is often taken for granted – the
nonprofit ethic of “make do with what you have” is at work here –
in fact there are strong possibilities for nonprofits to add value in
this area, just as with systems.
The Seven Elements 
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RUBICON PROGRAMS
The value of systems comes through clearly in the case of Rubicon.
Since 1994, Rubicon has undergone no less than three capacity
building efforts, in large measure spurred by a key supporter, the
venture philanthropy group Roberts Enterprise Development Fund
(REDF).  REDF funded the development of the most important
systems initiative – a social impact tracking system that would
allow Rubicon to quantify how well it was delivering on its
aspirations in terms of changed lives.  Well aware that systems
enhancements have far-reaching implications, Rick Aubry paid
close attention to constructing a collaborative process that would
lead to actual behavioral change by the staff when rolling out this
initiative.
The central feature of Rubicon’s measurement system was a
database to track client flows and outcomes.  Before beginning to
develop the software to manage this database, teams mapped the
client flow through the Rubicon system and defined the key
indicators that the database would track. Once the system was
ready, Rubicon invested significant time training its staff in running
the system and securing organizational buy-in to its value.  Similar
thought went to testing and actual software development.
On the surface, it might seem that Rubicon could simply have
farmed out the task of upgrading its database to a few competent
programmers from an outside consulting firm.  But Aubry’s
inspiration was to realize that this new system could and would do
more than simply improve the database and better track Rubicon’s
results to meet the reporting requirements of funders.  In addition
to meeting these criteria, the increase in data transparency has
enhanced the organization’s ability to assess the suitability of its




Perhaps most important, this capacity building effort aimed at
measuring impact has helped fundamentally reshape the organi-
zation’s performance culture.  This system and the high degree of
attention paid to it by senior management reinforce the message
that Rubicon is not building capacity for the sake building capacity,
but rather for increasing the organization’s social impact.
Management’s commitment to consistent communication about the
system and its efforts to secure broad buy-in and usage (including a
naming contest and launch party) have ensured that Rubicon’s 280
staff clearly understand the organization’s priorities. Aubry
concludes: “This new system has brought about significant cultural
changes internally.”   
The success of its capacity building efforts leaves Rubicon poised to
make the jump into taking its program to scale.  Its recent rapid
growth – the staff has quadrupled in 6 years – and increased
financial self-sufficiency – revenues have risen from $5 million in
1997 to $12 million in 2000 – tell part of the story. So too do the
results for clients.  By large margins, participants reported that
since being hired by Rubicon’s social purpose enterprises, they had
experienced an increase in income, better housing, and decreased
dependence on public assistance.  As a final measure, increased
capacity also helped Rubicon to serve more people:  from 800 in
1994 to 4,000 in 2000.
CARRERA PROGRAM
For some nonprofits, building capacity in infrastructure is as
important as building capacity in systems.  A case in point is the
program founded by Dr. Michael Carrera, a nationally respected
expert on teenage sexuality.  Carrera runs the National Adolescent
Sexuality Training Center, a program of the Children’s Aid Society
that attempts to influence decision-making and behavior as a means
of preventing teen pregnancy.
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take a comprehensive
view of our clients.  We 
reorganized the whole 
flow of clients through
Rubicon, stopped asking
people the same ques-
tions in three different
places, and created a 
single generic intake
instead of the previous
multiple, department-
specific intakes.”
— Dr. Rick Aubry,
Rubicon Programs
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His approach has three main ingredients.  First, it is long-term and
intensive, with teens engaged in the program at least 5 days a week
for as long as 5 to 8 years.  Second, it features a “parallel family
system” to provide teens with a stable, nurturing, family-like
environment.  Third, it provides participants with a comprehensive
range of support services, including education, employment
training, family life and sex education, medical care, and
counseling.
This holistic approach, combined with Carrera’s charismatic
leadership, enabled the program to achieve remarkable success in
three Children’s Aid Society locations where it was offered.  Teens
going through the program showed decreased pregnancy and birth
rates, delayed initiation of sexual intercourse, increased
employment experience, and access to more comprehensive health
care compared to a control group of teens.  
A key to Carrera’s success has been his relationship with the
Children’s Aid Society (CAS), which handles the infrastructure
needs of this program in the same way it manages its community
school program and other similar large-scale CAS programs.  CAS
provides the Carrera Program with office space and back-office
services such as accounting, payroll, administration, and communi-
cations.  In addition, CAS’s name increased the local and national
visibility of this pioneering enterprise.  As Carrera says, “We have
enormously benefited from the name of Children’s Aid Society, a
well-known organization, helping us establish quick credibility.”
CAS also provides Carrera with ongoing funding for general
operating expenses.  CAS has benefited from its 30-year
relationship with Carrera and is seen as a social services leader in
the areas of adolescent sexuality and pregnancy prevention.
Carrera thus serves as a charismatic representative of CAS’s work.
Systems and Infrastructure
“We have enormously 
benefited from the name
of Children’s Aid Society,
a well-known organization,






This arrangement has allowed the Carrera Program to focus on
core functions for a growing institution – program development
and fund-raising.  In short, it has bought Carrera time to refine his
approach and build his donor base without having to expend too
much time and effort building the infrastructure necessary to
support his model in the short run.  Of course, Carrera cannot
ignore capacity building forever, particularly now that he is looking
to take his model to scale, but this example illustrates the value of
mutually beneficial partnerships in strengthening capacity.  Carrera
is dramatically better positioned to take the next step in terms of
building capacity than he was before he entered into his
partnership with CAS.
The Seven Elements 
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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Along with systems improvements, nonprofits find it easiest to deal
with capacity building efforts that address issues of organizational
structure.  Clarifying roles and responsibilities, creating new work
groups or spinning off existing ones, developing and working with
a board – most of these activities are familiar to nonprofit
managers and therefore not overly threatening.  Because so many
people already equate capacity building exercises with reorgani-
zation, practitioners have even come to expect that their organi-
zations will undergo significant structural modifications at regular
intervals.
Structural “fixes” have to be taken with a grain of salt, however.  A
nonprofit can keep changing its organization chart every 3 months
if it wants, but it will never achieve institutional alignment unless
its organizational design supports not only systems and human
resources, but also its aspirations, strategies, and skills.  As with
other components of organizational capacity, changes in an organi-
zation’s structure are most effective when they are integrated with a
comprehensive package of capacity building initiatives.
AMERICA’S SECOND HARVEST
From its inception in 1979, America’s Second Harvest has
employed a unique structural model for advancing its mission of
creating a hunger-free America.  Second Harvest was established to
serve as the middleman between a nationwide network of local
food banks on the one hand and major food producers on the
other. Second Harvest collects bulk donations of food from
suppliers – 400 million pounds of it each year, valued at $682
million – and then uses a state-of-the-art logistics system to allocate
the food to local food banks, according to need.  The food banks
then distribute this food to an additional 50,000 soup kitchens,
shelters, and church feeding programs, which deliver the actual
service of feeding hungry people.
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Second Harvest occupies a critical niche in the process of getting
food from producers to the hungry.  It provides a single point of
contact for corporations that otherwise would have to work with
hundreds of food banks.  As a central repository of donated food,
it can direct resources to the most needy places or respond at
appropriate scale to a local food emergency.  By setting national
standards for food banks in areas such as food safety and handling
procedures, it provides local food banks with credibility that they
can leverage with local donors.
At the same time, this structure ensures that each of the local food
banks retains its own identity.  Food banks may well be members
of the America’s Second Harvest network, but first and foremost
they are proud and separate entities, with their own boards and
accountable to the people in their community.  Many of the food
banks, in fact, are powerhouse nonprofits themselves that received
only modest support from Second Harvest. The Greater Chicago
Food Depository, for instance, gets only 10 percent of its food from
the national organization, raising the remainder locally.  In trying
to maximize the impact of its entire network, Second Harvest must
therefore tread carefully and respect the autonomy of the local food
banks.
Yet Second Harvest is unafraid to make structural changes, even if
it means spending a lot of time educating and bringing along its
network.  A good example is the decision process that led to
Second Harvest’s recent merger with Foodchain, the country’s
largest food-rescue organization.  Food-rescue programs, which
transport perishable or prepared foods to the hungry before they
spoil, have taken off in recent years, to the point where perishable
foods are now the fastest-growing segment of the food donation
universe.  With its clients also agitating for more fresh food and
more diverse diets, America’s Second Harvest clearly understood
that the food-rescue business offered a significant opportunity to
increase its social impact.
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But with this opportunity came challenges.  At a practical level,
fresh goods, with a short shelf life, pose a far greater logistical
problem than bulk goods.  Most of the 50,000 agencies do not
have adequate refrigeration to store fresh produce, for example.
Second Harvest struggled with how best to approach a move into
the food-rescue business, with its options running the gamut from
building in-house capacity, to relying on its network of partners to
launch local food-rescue programs, to merging with Foodchain, the
leading program in field.
Second Harvest chose the merger route.  On the face of it, the
strategic fit seems solid.  The two organizations shared common
aspirations, but complemented each other neatly in the areas of
strategy and skills.  Second Harvest saved considerable time and
effort by wholly adopting Foodchain’s food-rescue model;
Foodchain gained financial security and the power of Second
Harvest’s food bank network.  Foodchain’s small national staff
(four people) ensured that integrating the two corporate cultures
would not be unduly onerous.
This structural response to changing conditions in the marketplace
has positioned Second Harvest for a sharp increase in its social
impact.  The addition of Foodchain’s local network of programs
promises to increase Second Harvest’s capacity, while simulta-
neously eliminating competition for funds and food donations.
With bulk food donations hitting a plateau, the food-rescue
business will likely account for much of Second Harvest’s growth
moving forward.  However, in order to realize the new potential
created, Second Harvest needs to complete its merger successfully




Not all structural capacity building efforts need be as large or
dramatic as America’s Second Harvest’s merger with Foodchain.
For example, the “Fellows Program” at Citizen Schools and the
“Powerful Writers” initiative at Powerful Schools both serve as
examples of what were at their core structural inventions.  Upon
implementation, both of these programs turned out to generate big
gains in human resources capacity and in turn increase the social
impact of these organizations.  In other cases, such as Vera Institute
and The Nature Conservancy, spinning off parts of the organi-
zation into new, separate nonprofit entities has enabled them to
stayed focused on their core competencies and thus remain
effective.  The point is that an organization’s structure needs to be
aligned with all the elements of nonprofit capacity, from the top-
tier of aspirations, strategy, and skills, to systems, culture, and
human resources.
The Seven Elements 
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CULTURE
Culture runs like an invisible thread throughout the entire subject
of capacity building.  How many times have we seen nonprofits go
through contortions to accommodate the demands of their organi-
zation’s culture?  Groups like The Nature Conservancy and Second
Harvest have gone to great lengths to preserve the sense of
autonomy and independence of their field units, reckoning that
these are a non-negotiable part of the culture.  Rubicon Programs
invested significant time and effort in rolling out its new tracking
system so that the organization’s culture would embrace and not
reject it. 
For nonprofits, culture plays an even more vital role than it does
for businesses.  The culture holds the organization together, an
important reason why nonprofit employees are willing to accept
relatively low pay and work so hard.  Because of its pervasiveness
and importance, nonprofit culture is difficult to change.  The
record is littered with nonprofit chief executives whose best-laid
plans to build capacity foundered on the shoals of an unimpressed
and tradition-bound culture.  This is a shame, because organi-
zations can strengthen their cultures just as they can strengthen any
of the other components of organizational capacity.  The trick lies
in making changes to the culture in a way that builds positively on
a shared commitment of staff and volunteers to the mission.  In this
arena, it is all too easy inadvertently to undermine the morale of
staff and volunteers.
For purposes of this discussion, we want to distinguish between
two aspects of an organization’s culture:  its core values, beliefs,
and behavior norms, on the one hand, and its performance
orientation, or “performance culture” on the other.  Neither of
these distinct concepts is well understood in the nonprofit sector,
with many practitioners operating under the assumption that
culture is little more than a composite of the various personalities,
experiences, ideas, and working styles of the people inside the
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organization.  In fact, building a strong values-based culture – or
building a strong performance culture – is a strategic, intellectual,
and often difficult process.  It requires a substantial commitment
from the organization in terms of time and resources, but the
payoff can be substantial.
CITY YEAR
Consider the case of City Year, which seeks to engage people in a
lifetime commitment to national service by tapping into the civic
power and idealism of 17- to 24-year-olds for a yearlong program
of full-time service, leadership development, and civic engagement.
City Year was founded in 1988 as an 8-week summer program in
Boston involving 50 people.  It was a small, local service program
with limited brand awareness and a culture that did little to hold
the enterprise together.
Even so, by 1990 City Year’s founders, Michael Brown and Alan
Khazei, were sufficiently encouraged by the results to expand the
program to a full year. But first they decided that it was essential to
build a cultural framework for the organization that would serve as
the backbone for setting performance expectations and operating
parameters, as well as creating a consistent and visible message to
the public.  Thus was launched the first of two capacity building
initiatives explicitly designed to strengthen City Year’s culture.
Brown and Khazei started by going on an extended intellectual
journey, consulting the writings of inspirational figures like Martin
Luther King Jr., Robert Kennedy, and Gandhi; reading widely on
topics ranging from entrepreneurship to mythology; and studying
other institutions and organizations that worked extensively with
young adults, such as the military, the Peace Corps, and New York
City’s City Volunteer Corps.  They were determined to create a
culture out of the whole cloth, from the very beginning, that would
not only enhance the ability of City Year corps members to serve
their communities, but also inculcate in corps members a lasting
sense of civic responsibility. 
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From these deliberations arose the core values and elements of the
City Year culture, along with the most visible of all symbols of the
program:  the uniform that all corps members wear.  It’s a bright
red jacket bearing the City Year logo, an American flag sewn to the
sleeve, khakis, Timberland boots, and a baseball hat.  To Brown
and Khazei, the uniform was a natural extension of the kind of
civic service they were promoting.  “We view national service as the
civilian equivalent of the military, so the uniform was a no-
brainer,” Khazei recalls. Another signature element of City Year’s
culture with military roots is the emphasis on physical training – all
corps members meet in the morning for group exercises.  At the
same time, the founders drew on their readings about the power of
myths and common rituals, and told and retold a set of common
stories that soon became embedded in the lore and values of the
organization.
Brown and Khazei believed that these efforts were essential to unite
a diverse organization, create an inclusive community, and promote
City Year’s model of service.  What’s more, distinctive uniforms
would help ensure a consistent image and brand.  The only
problem was that the initial corps members hated it – especially the
uniforms.  At the very least, they wanted to wear their own
baseball hats to retain a sense of individuality.
City Year quickly realized that it needed to make the culture
tangible for all members of the organization.  Working with The
Monitor Group, a private consulting firm, Brown and Khazei
launched a second capacity building effort to translate the culture’s
intellectual framework into shared practice – to institutionalize the
values.  They interviewed corps members and team leaders, talked
about the values at every opportunity, and observed the language
and rituals that each team had developed.
The uniform remained a hard sell, but for reasons of brand identity
and team building, City Year ultimately kept it.  But at the same
time, it dedicated considerable effort to introducing a series of
complementary initiatives that also sought to strengthen the
Culture
“Over time we realized
that team leaders were
developing their own 
culture out of necessity to





culture.  For example, it created and distributed “Power Tools,” a
set of shared activities, rituals, and words that communicate City
Year’s core values and that are applied consistently across the
enterprise. It developed a handbook, Putting Idealism to Work,
which captures the collective wisdom of the organization in 180
principles.  It launched City Year Academy, a training program for
team leaders that places enormous emphasis on how to do things
the “City Year Way.”  Even today, every team leader attends
training every year, regardless of how long they have been with the
organization.
It should come as no surprise that City Year is renowned
throughout the nonprofit sector for its powerful culture and shared
values, and it is by no means a stretch to suggest that much of the
organization’s success derives from its investment in building its
culture. City Year today has 1,000 corps members working in 13
different sites. Its revenue has grown from $700,000 in 1988 to
$25 million today and it enjoys the support of prominent public
and private sponsors.  In the first step toward Brown and Khazei’s
vision of universal national service, City Year served as the model
for creating the AmeriCorps program.
CITIZEN SCHOOLS
Where City Year put its emphasis on creating strong shared values,
other nonprofit organizations have strengthened their performance
culture – and sometimes as the byproduct of other capacity
building efforts.  In 1999, for example, Citizen Schools initiated a
capacity building plan in conjunction with the venture philan-
thropy organization New Profit, Inc., which committed $1 million
in cash and significant intellectual capital over 5 years.  But New
Profit’s contribution came with strings attached.  Only if Citizen
Schools engaged in a systematic effort to hone its strategy and
develop a growth plan – and only if it achieved predetermined
performance milestones – would New Profit renew its support from
year to year.
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Together with The Monitor Group, Citizen Schools and New Profit
have worked closely to clarify the organization’s strategy and
develop a “Balanced Scorecard” that translated its aspirations into
a set of concrete objectives and measures.  For example, the new
goal of Citizen Schools is to serve 15 percent of the Boston public
school population by 2003 and to become a national model for
after-school programming.  The key to the Balanced Scorecard,
though, was its comprehensiveness. It did not stop after providing
Citizen Schools with goals and measures of social impact; it also
included measures for financial performance, internal processes and
operations, learning, and growth and innovation.
The Scorecard now serves as a tool both for managing the organi-
zation internally and for managing the relationship with New
Profit.  Even New Profit’s funders will only have to pay their
pledged funds in later years if New Profit fulfills its own Balanced
Scorecard, which in turn depends on Citizen Schools’ Balanced
Scorecard.  The cumulative effect of all these efforts has been to
create a culture of measurement and accountability throughout
Citizen Schools. With the performance expectations clearly defined
– and with the organization’s financial health linked directly to
meeting them – everyone affiliated with Citizen Schools comes to
work knowing exactly what they need to do.  
As with other elements in the Capacity Framework, enhancements
in one area will often spill over into the others, and performance
culture is no exception.  In 1996, for example, the Carrera Program
initiated a 3-year study with a professional social services
evaluation firm to assess the social impact of the program.  The
purpose was to help validate the effectiveness of Carrera’s approach
to stopping teen pregnancy, but an unanticipated benefit was the
impact on the organization’s performance culture.  The new
emphasis on measurable outcomes led to a new appreciation of the
value of good information as a management tool.  As the lead
evaluator commented, “The staff became attuned to looking at
data every month and interpreting it.  They went from data
eschewers to data junkies.” As a result, the Carrera Program has
now embraced a performance culture dedicated to continual
assessment of program effectiveness and organizational capacity.
Culture
“The staff became attuned
to looking at data every
month and interpreting it.
They went from data
eschewers to data
junkies.”




Deducing the top-level message from these case studies isnot difficult.  Although we acknowledge that the samplewas too small to draw any concrete conclusions, the
research strongly suggested that capacity building initiatives have a
proven impact on nonprofit performance.  The best results,
meanwhile, were attained when organizations took a deliberate,
proactive approach to capacity building and assessed their needs in
relation to their entire enterprise.  Effective capacity building, we
found, is rarely confined to addressing only one of the elements in
isolation; as soon as a nonprofit starts digging around in its
systems, for example, it invariably discovers that it must also
examine, analyze, and address the ramifications that making
changes will have on the other elements.  For this reason, capacity
building must be firmly driven by the senior management of the
organization.
In addition, three other lessons emerge that cut across the nonprofit
sector, regardless of an organization’s size, mission, or business
model.  The first lesson is that the act of resetting aspirations and
strategy is often the first step toward a dramatic improvement of an
organization’s capacity.  Quite simply, unless an organization has a
clear idea of its purpose and strategy, it will never reach its full
potential.  The second lesson is that both leadership and
management are important.  Nonprofits need people in senior
positions who are committed to taking the initiative to make
capacity building happen and are willing to “own” it and drive it
down through the organization.  The third lesson is that you must
have patience.  In both the nonprofit and for-profit worlds,
building capacity can take a long time and can be very frustrating.
KEY SUCCESS FACTORS 
AND LESSONS LEARNED 
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RESETTING ASPIRATIONS AND RETHINKING STRATEGY
The organizations in this study that experienced the greatest gains
in capacity were those that undertook a reassessment of their
aspirations – their vision of what they were attempting to
accomplish in the next phase of development – and their strategy.
Closely linked to this sense of purpose was the integrated set of
actions designed to achieve the organization’s overarching goals.
Invariably, these steps provided a tight institutional focus and a
road map for the organization to use with both internal and
external audiences.
For evidence of the primacy of aspirations in nonprofit capacity
building, look no further than the experiences of organizations like
Take Stock in Children or Citizen Schools.  Both organizations
initially undertook capacity building initiatives without considering
altering their aspirations.  This is common in the sector, where
aspirations – no matter how inarticulately stated – are often
deemed politically untouchable.  Yet as soon as managers at both
of these enterprises started to examine their options for building
capacity at the systems and structural level, they were driven
straight to questions of mission, vision, and overarching goals.
It is important to emphasize that a new aspiration or strategy can
only be transformative if it is then used to align the other aspects of
organizational capacity.  At Take Stock in Children, for example,
aligning with the new mission meant among other things significant
changes in board and staff at both headquarters and affiliates, as
well as changes in systems and culture.  Even now, The Nature
Conservancy is struggling to align its skills, structure, and systems
to deliver better on its more lofty aspirations and goals.  Samaritan
Inns, meanwhile, did not allow current circumstances to get in the
way of its reassessment of its aspirations; indeed, in the face of
crisis Samaritan Inns raised the bar on its aspirations – and then
figured out how to get there.
Key Success Factors 
and Lessons Learned 
“I put a higher weight on
mission and strategy
when getting started –
you build the rest as you
go.  It is a bit like building
the boat as you are sailing
– but at least you know
your compass baring.
Knowing where you are
going will keep your keel
in the water and the boat
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THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
Most nonprofits with a long track record of tangible results have
inspirational, often visionary leaders.  But visionary leadership
should not be confused with visionary management, and on this
score, even some of the country’s highest performing nonprofits fall
short.  Effectively resetting aspirations and strategy, institution-
alizing sound management processes, improving systems to work at
scale – progress on any of these requires managerial ability as well
as good leadership.  As Michael Carrera discovered, without strong
management an organization can only go so far.
Carrera’s energy and personal charisma were essential to the early
success of his approach to combating teen pregnancy, but when he
tried to replicate his program on a larger scale, his own managerial
shortcomings and limited organizational capacity soon became
evident.  Carrera was open to the recommendations of the Robin
Hood Foundation about how to tackle the complex management
and infrastructure issues that would make or break Carrera’s effort
to expand.  But not all nonprofit managers are so self-aware, and
there is a tendency across the sector for executive directors –
especially if they are the founders of the organization – to resist
comprehensive capacity building exercises.
To be sure, there are other constraints that prevent nonprofit
managers from taking the plunge into capacity building.  It takes a
certain kind of leader, or personality, to combine not only the right
skills, but also the commitment to tackle capacity building
proactively and be willing to push it throughout the organization.
In addition, many nonprofit managers simply lack the time, money,
or awareness to put adequate effort into capacity building.  This
point underscores the importance of “building the capacity to build
capacity” – in other words, freeing up management time and
organizational resources from daily responsibilities, in order to be
able to focus on the bigger-picture issues of capacity building.
Key Success Factors 
and Lessons Learned 
“I just did everything, and
when things didn’t go
well, I just put in more
hours.  How could I stop
long enough to bring 
people on?  But now I
know the beginning of 
wisdom is asking ‘what is
my organizational struc-
ture?’  and then figuring





What organizations facing these circumstances often need is a chief
operating officer – a trained professional manager who can ensure
that the organization functions efficiently and effectively.  This
arrangement allows the chief executive – often charismatic, often
the founder – to focus on promoting a common vision for the
organization and on mobilizing people inside and out to take
action.  Based on our research, very few individuals excel from the
outset at both leadership and management; in fact, as nonprofit
executives who complete the capacity assessment soon learn, most
organizations have a glaring capacity gap in the area high-level
managerial skills.  This is one capacity issue where ego often
trumps effectiveness, and that should change.
THE IMPORTANCE OF PATIENCE
The last and most universal lesson is that the wise nonprofit
manager takes a long-term view.  Institutionalizing best practices in
nonprofits through capacity building is typically a lengthy, arduous
process.  The Nature Conservancy has been focusing on enhancing
its capacity pretty much continuously for more than a decade.
Samaritan Inns is 4 years removed from the decision to cut off
public funding for drug rehabilitation programs, and nonetheless
still has miles to travel before it has achieved true organizational
alignment. For some organizations capacity building proves to be
too much of a challenge.  For example BOSS, a San Francisco Bay
Area self-help program, pulled out of a capacity building effort in
which it had invested considerable time and effort, and which had
been heavily advocated by a venture philanthropy group.
Almost everything about building capacity in nonprofits (and in
for-profit companies) takes longer and is more complicated than
one would expect.  One reason is that organizations have
traditionally underinvested in capacity, leaving them in need of
improvement in virtually every area.  The sad fact is that few
recognize the extent of their predicament, a failing also common to
capacity builders and donors.  There are few quick fixes when it
comes to building capacity, and in many cases it is unrealistic and
often counterproductive for capacity builders to demand immediate
results, reported quarterly.
Key Success Factors 
and Lessons Learned 
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Meanwhile, organizations that are part of federations or networks,
like America’s Second Harvest, already expend enormous effort
managing the relationships with their affiliates and the network
partners.  Rolling out a new, networkwide capacity initiative
requires extensive consultation and buy-in, adding time and cost to
the project.  The strong culture in nonprofits can also dilute the
desired impact of capacity building, especially in organizations that
are decentralized or that champion the autonomy of local operating
units.  Nonprofit managers therefore need to bring along their staff
and volunteers carefully if they intend to make any dramatic
changes.
Finally, in nonprofits as in for-profit firms, these issues are all
intertwined. Alignment is a continuous process simply because
improvements in one area or practice have a way of placing
unexpected new demands on other areas, which in turn necessitate
upgrading.  As we argued earlier, the interconnectedness of the
elements of capacity does not imply that organizations should seek
to build capacity in all of them at the same time, but rather that
nonprofit managers should be aware of the relationship between
elements when contemplating a capacity building initiative of one
sort or another.  The chances of severing issues of structure, say,
from systems and human resources are remote at best.
Key Success Factors 
and Lessons Learned 
“We often think of 
capacity on a single
dimension – staff,
computing, financial – and
it is easy enough to
increase any one of these.
But to make a meaningful,
long-term shift in organiza-
tional capacity requires a
campaign on many fronts
at once...”
— Chris Stone,
Vera Institute of Justice
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For the nonprofit manager, building organizational capacitycan seem daunting indeed.  It can be hard to fund, hard tolaunch, and hard to implement.  It takes a long time and the
need is not always apparent to staff, volunteers, board members, or
donors.  But nonprofit leaders cannot allow themselves to be
dismayed by these obstacles, because nonprofits enjoy an inherent
advantage.  At its core, the nonprofit sector is driven by people
committed to a mission and to increased social impact.
Consequently, employees, board members, and donors will almost
invariably respond positively to a proposal that will clearly advance
the mission, no matter how radical the proposal is. That is why
visionary nonprofit managers like David Erickson, Chris Stone, and
Michael Carrera have placed such emphasis on developing ways of
quantifying the social impact of their organizations through
evaluation and research programs.  Demonstrate the increased
social impact from capacity building and opposition will soon fade.
Prudent leaders, of course, will avoid opposition in the first place.
Instead, they will recognize the importance of building organiza-
tional capacity from the very start and make it the hallmark of their
tenure.  They do not wait for a crisis before addressing capacity
gaps; rather, they will aggressively seek out those gaps and take
measures to fill them.  Capacity building does matter, and it does
make a difference in a nonprofit’s ability to fulfill its aspirations.
The sooner nonprofits realize this and start assessing their capacity
needs, and the sooner funders increase their support for capacity
building efforts, the better off nonprofits – and society as a whole –
will be.
CONCLUSION
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D E S C R I P T I O N
 The McKinsey Capacity Assessment Grid is a tool designed to
help nonprofit organizations assess their organizational capaci-
ty.  The grid should be used in conjunction with the Capacity
Framework, which explains the seven elements of organization-
al capacity and their components.  The grid asks the reader to
score the organization on each element of organizational
capacity, by selecting the text that best describes the organiza-
tion's current status or performance.  The framework and the
descriptions in the grid were developed based on our team’s
collective experience as well as the input of many nonprofit
experts and practitioners.
 The grid may be used by nonprofit managers, staff, board
members and external capacity builders and funders with the
following objectives:
• To identify those particular areas of capacity that are strongest
and those that need improvement
• To measure changes in an organization's capacity over time
• To draw out different views within an organization regarding
its capacity; different responses to the grid among staff, Board
members and funders, for example, can be a valuable
discussion-starter within an organization
APPENDIX:
CAPACITY ASSESSMENT GRID
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 The grid is not a scientific tool, and should not be used as one.
It is very difficult to quantify the dimensions of capacity, and
the descriptive text under each score in the grid is not meant to
be exact.  The scores are meant to provide a general indication
– a "temperature" taking, if you will – of an organization's
capacity level, in order to identify potential areas for improve-
ment. Furthermore, the results of the exercise should be inter-
preted in the context of the organizatins stage of development.
For example, a score of “2” on organizational processes may
be sufficient for a new organization, and this area may not
merit immediate attention.  In fact, many organizations may
never get to level 4 on many elements.
 This tool is meant to be a starting point only.  We encourage
you to adapt the grid to meet your own organization's capacity
assessment needs.
I N S T R U CT I O N S
GUIDELINES FOR SURVEY ADMINISTRATORS 
Decide for which point(s) in time you want to assess the nonprofit's
organizational capacity – e.g., today, beginning of last year, 3 years
ago, etc.  You may choose to assess the organization at two
different points in time, in order to measure changes in capacity.
Select the people whom you want to assess the nonprofit
(assessors); these can include nonprofit staff members, board
members, or external parties.  Ideally, assessors should have a good
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For the human resources section, decide whom you wish to
evaluate in the set of rows pertaining to "CEO/ED and/or senior
management team."  Options include 1) CEO/ED only; 2) CEO/ED
and senior management team considered collectively; 3) CEO/ED
on the one hand and senior management team on the other; or 4)
individuals taken separately. If you choose option 3 or 4, you may
need to copy the relevant section for each separate person or group
of persons covered by the assessment.
GUIDELINES FOR THOSE FILLING OUT THE SURVEY
(ASSESSORS) 
For each row, determine the description most suitable for the point
in time chosen and write the date (e.g., 6/99) in that box.  If you
are also conducting the assessment for a second point in time,
repeat the procedure with the corresponding date (e.g., 6/01). 
Mark the box that is closest to describing the situation at hand;
descriptions will rarely be perfect.  Interpret the text loosely when
necessary and keep in mind that you are trying to score your
organization on the continuum of "1" to "4."  You may select the
limit between two boxes if this seems most accurate.
If a row is not relevant to the organization assessed, designate the
row "N/A"; if you simply have no knowledge, mark the row
"N/K."   
A PDF file of the Capacity Assessment Grid can be obtained on





• Vision – clarity





• Program relevance, and integration
• Program growth and replication
• New program development
• Funding model
III. Organizational skills
• Performance management 
– Performance measurement
– Performance analysis and program adjustments
• Planning




– Human resources planning
• Fund-raising and revenue generation
– Fund-raising
– Revenue generation
• External relationship building and management
– Partnership and alliances development and 
nurturing
– Local community presence and involvement
Capacity Assessment Grid
CONTENTS 
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• Other organizational skills
– Public relations and marketing
– Influencing of policy-making
– Management of legal and liability matters
– Organizational processes use and development 
IV. Human resources
• Staffing levels
• Board – composition and commitment
• Board – involvement and support
• CEO/executive director and/or senior management team
– Passion and vision 
– Impact orientation
– People and organizational leadership/effectiveness
– Personal and interpersonal effectiveness
– Analytical and strategic thinking
– Financial judgment
– Experience and standing
• Management team and staff – dependence on 
CEO/executive director
• Senior management team (if not previously covered)
• Staff
• Volunteers
V. Systems and infrastructure
• Systems
– Planning systems
– Decision making framework
– Financial operations management





– Human resources management – general staff recruiting,
development, and retention
– Human resources management – incentives
– Knowledge management
• Infrastructure
– Physical infrastructure – buildings and office space
– Technological infrastructure – telephone/fax
– Technological infrastructure – computers, applications,
network, and e-mail
– Technological infrastructure – Web site
– Technological infrastructure – databases and management 
reporting systems




• Individual job design
VII.Culture
• Performance as shared value
• Other shared beliefs and values
• Shared references and practices
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I. ASPIRATIONS
1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place
4 High level of
capacity in place




existence; lacks clarity or
specificity; either held by





that reflects its values
and purpose, but may







which reflects its values
and purpose; held by
many within organization
and often referred to
Clear expression
of organization’s
reason for existence which
describes an enduring
reality that reflects its
values and purpose; broadly
held within organization and
frequently referred to
Vision – clarity Little shared
understanding of
what organization aspires







become or achieve; lacks
specificity or clarity; held
by only a few; or “on the
wall,” but rarely used to





to become or achieve;
held by many within the
organization and often






become or achieve; broadly
held within organization and
consistently used to direct
actions and set priorities









along only one of
following two attributes:
reflects an inspiring view










Overarching goals Vision (if it exists)
not explicitly
translated into small set
of concrete goals, though





what it aims to achieve
Vision translated
into a concrete
set of goals; goals lack at
least two of following four
attributes: clarity,
boldness, associated
metrics, or time frame for
measuring attainment;
goals known by only a
few, or only occasionally
used to direct actions or
set priorities
Vision translated
into small set of
concrete goals, but goals




time frame for measuring
attainment; goals are
known by many within
organization and often
used by them to direct
actions and set priorities
Vision translated into
clear, bold set of (up




success for each criterion,
and by well-defined time
frames for attaining goals;
goals are broadly known
within organization and
consistently used to direct






















1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place
4 High level of
capacity in place
Overall strategy Strategy is either
nonexistent,
unclear, or incoherent
(largely set of scattered
initiatives); strategy has
no influence over day-to-
day behavior
Strategy exists
but is either not
clearly linked to mission,
vision, and overarching
goals, or lacks
coherence, or is not
easily actionable;
strategy is not broadly





been developed and is
linked to mission and
vision but is not fully
ready to be acted upon;
strategy is mostly known
and day-to-day behavior is




strategy that is both
actionable and linked to
overall mission, vision, and
overarching goals; strategy
is broadly known and
consistently helps drive day-






targets are vague, or
confusing, or either too
easy or impossible to
achieve; not clearly linked
to aspirations and
strategy, and may change





key areas, and are mostly
aligned with aspirations





(things to do right), or
often renegotiated; staff








(results of doing things
right) with some “inputs”;
typically multiyear
targets, though may lack
milestones; targets are
known and adopted by
most staff who usually





targets in all areas; targets
are tightly linked to
aspirations and strategy,
output/outcome-focused
(i.e., results of doing things
right, as opposed to inputs,
things to do right), have
annual milestones, and are
long-term nature; staff
consistently adopts targets














defined and can be solidly
linked with mission and
goals; program offerings
may be somewhat





defined and aligned with
mission and goals;
program offerings fit




defined and fully aligned
with mission and goals;
program offering are clearly























some ability either to













possibility of scaling up
existing programs and when
judged appropriate, action
always taken; efficiently and
effectively able to grow
existing programs to meet
needs of potential service





of gaps in ability
of current program to
meet recipient needs;
limited ability to create
new programs; new
programs created largely




gaps in ability of existing
program to meet recipient
needs, with little or
limited action taken;





gaps in ability of existing









gaps in ability of existing
programs to meet recipient
needs and adjustment
always made; ability and
tendency efficiently and
effectively to create new,
truly innovative programs to
the needs of potential
service recipients in local
area or other geographies;























1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place




on a few funders, largely






types of funding (e.g.,
government, foundations,
corporations, private
individuals) with only a
few funders in each type,
or has many funders

































89Ve n t u r e  P h i l a n t h r o p y  P a r t n e r s
III. ORGANIZATIONAL
SKILLS
1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place













some data on program
activities and outputs
(e.g., number of children










data on program activities
and outputs (e.g., number

















term) or third-party nature







and progress on continual
basis, including social,
financial, and organizational
impact of program and















comparisons made;  
internal performance data  























benchmarking part of the
culture and used by staff in
target-setting and daily
operations; high awareness
of how all activities rate
against internal and exter-
nal best-in-class bench-
marks; systematic practice
of making adjustments and
















models in program area
but limited ability to





models in program area;
good ability to adapt be-






models in program area;
refined ability and
systematic tendency to
adapt behavior based on
understanding
Planning
Strategic planning Limited ability
and tendency to
develop strategic plan,
either internally or via
external assistance; if




















out on a near-regular







critical mass of internal
expertise in strategic














budget for entire central
organization; performance




update; budget utilized as

























into full operations; as stra-
tegic tool, it develops from
process that incorpo-rates
and reflects organiza-tional
needs and objectives; well-
understood divisional (pro-
gram or geographical) bud-
gets within overall central
budget; performance-to-bud-
























1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place
4 High level of
capacity in place
Operational planning Organization runs
operations purely
on day-to-day basis with








internally or via external
assistance; operational















carried out on a near-
regular basis; operational
plan linked to strategic
planning activities and













plan tightly linked to
strategic planning activities






or addresses HR needs
only when too large to








develop high-level HR plan
either internally or via
external assistance; HR









expertise in HR planning
or access to relevant
external assistance; HR
planning carried out on
near-regular basis; HR
plan linked to strategic
planning activities and





realistic, and detailed HR
plan; has critical mass of
internal expertise in HR
planning (via trained,





regularly; HR plan tightly
linked to strategic planning
activities and systematically










skills and lack of
expertise (either internal






skills and expertise, and












raising skills and expertise
in all funding source types
to cover all regular needs;
access to external expertise
for additional extraordinary
needs
Revenue generation No internal
revenue-
generation activities;
concepts such as cause-
related marketing, fee-for-


























experienced and skilled in




support, but don’t distract































relationships with variety of
relevant parties (local,
state, and federal
government entities as well
as for-profit, other nonprofit,
and community agencies);
relationships deeply

























1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place








generally not regarded as





























as actively engaged with
and extremely responsive to





























marketing to be useful,
and actively seeks
opportunities to engage in
these activities; critical








and continually and actively











ability or is unaware of
possibilities for
influencing policy-making;




is aware of its
possibilities in influencing
policy-making; some







of its possibilities in
influencing policy-making
and is one of several
organizations active in
policy-discussions on




making, in a highly effective
manner, on state and
national levels; always ready
for and often called on to
participate in substantive








































access to general and
specialized external
















processes is variable, or







core areas for ensuring
efficient functioning of
organization; processes
known, used, and truly








of processes in place in




known and accepted by









set of processes (e.g.,
decision making, planning,
reviews) in place in all areas
to ensure effective and
efficient functioning of
organization; processes are
widely known, used and
accepted, and are key to




























1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place
4 High level of
capacity in place






























to organization (e.g., staff,
volunteers, board, senior
management) are all fully







of fields of practice and




































vision and mission, and









fields of practice and
expertise, and drawn from






as well as high-profile
names; high willingness and
proven track record of























































valuing of collective wisdom
CEO/executive director and/
or senior management team

















highly committed; lives the
organization’s vision;
compellingly articulates
path to achieving vision that
























1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place
4 High level of
capacity in place
Impact orientation Focused purely
on social impact;
financials viewed as an
unfortunate constraint;






















impact; focuses on ways
to better use existing
resources to deliver
highest impact possible;










mission of social impact and
optimal financial efficiency;




sense of urgency about
upcoming challenges;
communicates compelling
need for change that









and rapport with others;
micromanages projects;






from others to work
together; expresses
confidence in others’









freedom to work their own
way; gives people










motivate people; able to let
others make decisions and








































to get buy-in, appreciates
the impact of his/her
words or actions; seeks








charisma, to inspire others
and achieve impact;
continually self-aware,
actively works to better
oneself; outstanding track






and ambiguity and does
whatever possible to
reduce or avoid it; relies
mainly on intuition rather
than strategic analysis
Is able to cope
with some
complexity and ambiguity;
able to analyze strategies




















and actions to lower risks







all the facts; understands
basic financial concepts
and drives for financial

































1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place
4 High level of
capacity in place
CEO/executive director and/












































understanding of the sector;


















continue to exist without
his/her presence, but






would continue in similar
way without his/her







take on CEO/ED role
Reliance but
not dependence
on CEO/ executive director;
smooth transition to new
leader could be expected;
fund-raising and operations
likely to continue without
major problems; senior
management team can fill in
during transition time;
several members of manage-
ment team could potentially
















has no or very limited
capabilities and track
record from other fields;













track record from other
fields; good track record













record from other fields;













track record from other
fields; outstanding track








abilities limited to present
job; little ability to solve





including some ability to
solve problems as they
arise; many interested in
work beyond their current





and bring a broad range of
skills; most are highly
capable and committed to
mission and strategy;







broad range of skills; most
staff are highly capable in
multiple roles, committed
both to mission/ strategy
and continuous learning;
most are eager and able to
take on special projects and
collaborate across divisional
lines; staff are frequent


























1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place





















and to “making things
happen”; work easily with
most staff, but do not











loyal, highly committed to
organization’s success and
to “making things happen”;
often go beyond call of duty;
able to work in a way that
serves organization well,
including ability to work
easily with wide range of















1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place
4 High level of
capacity in place
Planning systems Planning happens
on an ad hoc


















by ad hoc planning when
needed; clear, formal
systems for data collection
in all relevant areas; data
used systematically to
















is generally followed, but










but could be improved
Clear, formal lines/
systems for
decision making that involve
























audited fund flows well
managed; attention is



































plans for brightest stars;
personal annual reviews
incorporate development








and retention of key














sources of new talent
Well-planned
process to recruit,






for brightest stars; relevant







willingness to ensure high-
quality job occupancy; well-
connected to potential




















































willingness to ensure high-
quality job occupancy;
continuous, proactive


























1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place







speak of; or incentive
system that is ineffective
and/or generates bad will
Some basic
elements of
incentive system in place;














system in place; includes





























in a few areas
but either not user-
friendly or not
comprehensive enough to
have an impact; systems





systems in some areas;
not fully comprehensive;
systems are known by








internally in all relevant
areas; all staff is aware of
systems, knowledgeable in
their use, and make








































structure for the current




locations for clients and
employees, sufficient
































accessible to most staff;
may be moderately
reliable or user-friendly, or




voice-mail), or may not be






accessible to entire staff
(in office and at front












telephone and fax facilities
accessible by all staff (in




facilities (e.g., pagers, cell
phones) for selected staff;



























1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place












activity; and/or little or






aside from central offices;
equipment sharing may be
common; satisfactory use





by central and local staff;





level of IT infrastructure







applications; all staff has
individual computer access
and e-mail; accessible by
frontline program deliverers
as well as entire staff; used
regularly by staff; effective





























and interactive Web site,
regularly maintained and




























systems exist only in few
areas; systems perform
only basic features, are
awkward to use or are





systems exist in most








































VI. ORGANIZATIONAL 1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place
4 High level of
capacity in place
Board governance Board does
not scrutinize
budgets or audits, does
not set performance
targets and hold CEO/ED






















board, and managers are
clear and function well;
board reviews budgets,
audits, IRS and state







CEO/ED to meet targets;
annual review of CEO’s
performance, but board




and managers work well
together from clear roles;
board fully understands and
fulfills fiduciary duties; size







empowered and prepared to








regional and local offices)








are clearly defined, others
are not; most roles and
responsibilities of
organizational entities are
formalized but may not
reflect organizational
realities; organization




clearly defined; all roles
and responsibilities of
organizational entities are



















































relationships are dictated by
organizational needs (rather
than hierarchy or politics)
Individual job design Lack of positions
created to
address a number of key




with many overlaps; job
descriptions do not exist
Positions exist
for most key
roles, with a few still
missing; most key
positions are well-defined
and have job descriptions;
some unclear
accountabilities or
overlap in roles and
responsibilities; job




















defined core roles which
must be achieved and an
area of discretion where
they can show initiative and
try to make a difference;
core roles are defined in
terms of end-products and
services rather than
activities; individuals have
the ability to define their

























1 Clear need for
increased capacity
2 Basic level of
capacity in place
3 Moderate level of
capacity in place







for executing a set of
tasks/duties or for no
clear reason, rather than
for their impact; decisions




is occasionally used and








to social, financial and
organizational impact is











atically hired, rewarded and

















exists in some groups
within the organization,
but is not shared broadly;
values may be only
partially aligned with
organizational purpose or




held by many people
within the organization;
helps provide members a








and values (e.g., social,
religious) exists and is
widely shared within the
organization; provides
members sense of identity
and clear direction for
behavior; beliefs embodied
by leader but nevertheless
timeless and stable across
leadership changes; beliefs
clearly support overall















the organization (such as
traditions, rituals,
unwritten rules, stories,




and practices exists in
some groups within the
organization, but are not
shared broadly; may be
only partially aligned with
organizational purpose or




and practices exists, and
are adopted by many
people within the
organization; references











heroes or role models,
symbols, language, dress;
are truly shared and
adopted by all members of
the organization; actively
designed and used to clearly
support overall purpose of
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